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I. INTRODUCTION
An implied-in-law requirement to act in good-faith and deal fairly
guides third-party insurers.I Moreover, the duty of an insurer to act in
good-faith abides in first-party insurance agreements. A judgment to the
contrary violates one of the fundamental principles enunciated in the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts,3 as well as the Uniform Commercial
Code.4 Consequently, the good-faith obligation overshadows an insurer
1. See Theresa Viani Agee, Breach of an Insurer's Good-faith Duty To Its Insured:
Tort or Contract?, 1988 UTAH L. REv. 135, 136 (1988) (concluding that whether an
insurer's breach of its duty to deal in good-faith with an insured in a first-party case
constitutes a cause of action in contract or tort has far-reaching consequences for
the insurance industry). Agee defines "third party insurance" as "policies which
insulate the insured against liability for detriment to the person or property of a
third individual." Id. at 136; see also 12 GEORGEJ. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE §
51:3 (2d ed. rev. 1982) ("That is to say, the exclusive right to defend carries the
obligation to act in good-faith, and where the insurer exercises bad-faith by
fraudulently or oppressively refusing to settle, and such action results in damage to
the insured, the insurer is liable therefor.").
In Minnesota, the recognition of third-party bad-faith stems from the
Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384,
385 (Minn. 1983). The court, in recognizing such a claim, discussed the fiduciary
nature of the relationship existing between insurer and insured in a third party
context. See id. at 387.
2. See Agee, supra note 1, at 137. Agee defines "first-party insurance" as an
insurance contract "in which the insurance company agrees to indemnify the in-
sured for personal losses the insured sustains." Id.
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good-faith and fair dealing in its performance
and its enforcement.") (emphasis added). The Minnesota Supreme Court has ex-
pressly adopted this provision of the Restatement. See In re Hennepin County 1986
Rc yclig6 Bodu L -Iug. 540 N..d 494, 502 ( Minii. 1995); Piaisted v. Fuhr 367
N.W.2d 541, 545 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
4. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1996); MINN. STAT. § 336.1-203 (1998) ("Every contract
or duty ... imposes an obligation of good-faith in its performance or enforce-
ment.") (emphasis added). Although an insurance contract does not involve the
sale of goods, the Minnesota Supreme Court has applied the Uniform Commercial
[Vol. 26:2
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Minnesota courts have yet to recognize an insured's right to seek re-
6 7
dress against a first-party insurer for bad-faith breach. If national trends
offer any insight into how Minnesota might approach the issue in the fu-
ture, first-party bad-faith will become a recognized cause of action.
Whether the cause of action arises through the judicial or legislative
branch is anyone's guess.
Suppose an insured hotel owner's facilities burn to a heaping pile of
ash. Subsequently, the insurer denies coverage on the claim, reasoning
that the insured intentionally set the hotel ablaze. The insurer, however,
cannot characterize the insured as an arsonist through any affirmative
proof.9 The significance of the insurer deciding not to honor the lan-
Code by analogy where necessary. See, e.g., Holman Erection Co. v. Orville E. Mad-
sen & Sons, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 693, 697 (Minn. 1983) (applying the Uniform Com-
mercial Code in a dispute regarding the construction of a public wastewater
treatment facility).
5. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4. In essence, this requirement is a
part of the performance of the contract, thereby triggering the good-faith obliga-
tion. See also Agee, supra note 1, at 137 (citing Kerry B. Harvey & Thomas A.
Wisemen III, First Party Bad-Faith: Common Law Remedies And A Proposed Legislative
Solution, 72 Ky. L.J. 141, 145 (1983) (providing an overview of bad-faith remedies
in insurance litigation)); Alan I. Widiss, Obligating Insurers to Inform Insureds About
the Existence of Rights and Duties Regarding Coverage for Losses, 1 CoNN. INS. L.J. 67, 95
(1995) ("Providing an ounce of information to an insured is far better than a
pound of explanations orjustifications for the failure to inform an insured.").
6. See STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD-FArrH ACrIONS: LiABILrIy AND DAMAGES § 2-54
(2d. ed. 1997) ("A substantial minority of jurisdictions have rejected a common-
law tort cause of action for bad-faith in first-party cases.").
7. See id. The author notes that every state, except Florida, Georgia, Illinios,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York,
Oregon, Pennsylvania and Tennessee recognize first-party bad-faith. See id. at § 2-
54-55.
8. In recent times, several first-party bad-faith bills have been submitted to
the Minnesota Legislature for consideration. See, e.g., 1999 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
738 (West). This bill states:
An insured under a fire or homeowner's insurance policy issued pursu-
ant to [Minnesota law] may bring an action against the insurer issuing
the policy alleging that the insurer refused in bad-faith to pay a claim
made by the insured under the provisions of the policy. An insurer has
refused to pay a claim in bad-faith if the insurer refused to pay the claim
without having a reasonable basis for the refusal, and, at the time of the
refusal, the insurer knew there was no reasonable basis for the refusal or
acted in reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for the re-
fusal. An insurer has not acted in bad-faith in refusing to pay an in-
sured's claim if the claim is fairly debatable, in law or in fact. This section
does not apply to an action by an insured or a third party against an in-
surer for wrongful failure to provide a defense or to settde a third-party
claim under a liability insurance contract.
2000]
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guage of its contract with the aforementioned insured involves, arguably, aS 10 . 11
breach of the non-negotiable duty to act in good-faith.
An often fiercely contested issue involves whether the insured is enti-
fled not only to compensation for the building loss, but also extra-
contractual damages, including punitive and consequential relief, stem-
ming from the insured's breach of the good-faith obligation. After all,
there is an inherent incentive for an insurer to delay settlement while the13
insured's demands swell, particularly if the insurer's exposure cannot
exceed the policy limits. 11
A majority of jurisdictions have answered affirmatively, and allow
Id.
9. This fact situation is common. See infra Part II. About a year ago, a rural
Minnesota jury returned a verdict of 1.1 million dollars in favor of a mistreated
first-party insured. See Shimer v. United Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. C5-98-64 (D.
Minn. March 5, 1999). In Shimer, the insured owned a resort and hotel located in
Walker, Minnesota. See id. In June 1997, a fire swept through the property, caus-
ing extensive structural and cosmetic damage. See id. The insured timely submit-
ted its proof of loss, but the insurer denied coverage for several reasons. See id.
The insurer claimed the insured intentionally set the hotel ablaze and accused the
insured of willfully defrauding them. See id.
After a million-dollar verdict against the insurer, the insured brought suit
to collect punitive damages under the bad-faith doctrine. See id. Before opening
arguments could take place, the insurer opted to settle for an undisclosed amount.
See id. Is it is possible that the case fell into the statistical reality that most cases set-
de before trial? Perhaps a more compelling motivation for the insurer to settle
involved its lack of interest in a higher court taking on the issue of whether first-
party bad-faith becomes a recognized claim. This settlement may have cost the
insurer several hundred thousand dollars, but may have also saved it millions in
punitive payoffs, at least in the short term. At a minimum, the insurer and insured
were, conceivably, both satisfied in some fashion. Still, a case ripe on the issue of
first-party bad-faith disintegrated.
10. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
11. Cf 15A COUCH, supra note 1, § 58:3 ("Bad faith may also be viewed as in-
terference with contractual relations since the primary interests of the insured
were invaded by the defendant insurer's conduct are the rights to receive per-
formance under an existing contract.").
12. For example, an insured may file a one million dollar claim. An insurer's
defense costs may run forty to fifty thousand dollars over the course of several
years. Concurrently, the insurer may continue investing funds from the unpaid
claim and earn twice its attorneys fees. Even if the insured prevails at trial, the in-
surer ultimately wins.
13. For instance, the fact that a fire destroys an insured's property does not
alter the insured's obligation to one's mortgagor.
14. See Phyllis Savage, The Avaiiability of Excess Damages for Wrongful Refusal to
.iicwd riif& I 1muiuauce Claui'n--An Enwigng Ti rri, O15 fA L. RoV. 164,
164-67 (1976) (arguing that it is to nobody's advantage if the insurance industry is
weakened by repeated payments of excessive awards).
15. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7; see also 15A COUCH, supa note 1, §
58:3. See, e.g., Allen Van Etten, Insurer Bad-Faith Comes to Hawaii: The Best Place v.
Penn America, HAw. B.J., Aug. 1996, at 24 (providing an overview of Hawaiian
[Vol. 26:2
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insureds to pursue damages exceeding their policy limits.' 6 These courts17
have done so, however, under two distinct theories of recovery. It seems
that "[t ] he scope of what is recognized by common law courts as a tort has
grown so that torts and contract are no longer distinct, rather they over-
lap." With this in mind, some courts grant relief to the insured under a19
tort theory. Conversely, other courts grant relief under an extension of2 0
the traditional rules associated with a breach of contract claim.
Predicting which approach Minnesota courts will accept is difficult.
2 1
22
Some appellate decisions seem to sound in contract. Others suggest the
tort approach is likely.23
This article examines the contract and tort theory of recovering ex-
tra-contractual damages when an insurer breaches its implied duty of
good-faith and fair dealing in a first-party insurance claim. In section II,
the article provides an overview of the tort and contract theories of recov-
24
ery in jurisdictions outside of Minnesota. Section III demonstrates that
25
Minnesota's approach to the issue may sound in either tort or contract.26
Section IV balances the tort and contract theories against one another.
The article concludes that the Minnesota Supreme Court should, when
27
and if it recognizes first-party bad-faith, implement the contract theory.
II. THE TORT AND CONTRACT THEORY ACROSS THE UNITED STATES
The tort and contract theories of recovery are, naturally, different
rules with various elements and consequences. The distinguishing feature
of the tort theory of recovery is that first-party insureds may collect puni-
tive damages beyond their policy limits with an insurer. Therefore, a
case law related to the tort theory of recovering extra-contractual damages in first-
party bad-faith claims).
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Parts II.A-B.
18. Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 344 (Haw. 1996) (in-
volving an insured who brought suit against fire insurer for breach of contract and
tortious breach of implied covenant of good-faith and fair dealing, after insurer
denied his fire claim).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part V.
28. By definition, punitive damages "are not intended as compensation.
Rather, they are intended to punish and serve as a deterrence to others." Mrozka
v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 814 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (Randall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
20001
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court may impose a penalty, unpredictable in amount, upon the insurer
acting in bad-faith. To the contrary, a first-party insurer subject to the
contract theory may be responsible for consequential damages exceed-
ing the insured's maximum payoff. Hence, the insurer's responsibility
ends with an amount equal to insured losses that were reasonably foresee-
able at the time of contract formation.
A. The Tort Theory of Recovery
Before 1973, courts generally endorsed the common-law notion that
damages for an insured's bad-faith breach were generally limited to the
terms of one's insurance policy.3 1 Many scholars attribute the tort theory
The issue of punitive damages in the insurance arena was a hot topic in
the 1990s. In 1991, the United States Supreme Court addressed constitutional
limitations on an award of punitive damages. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Has-
lip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991) (holding that punitive damages four times the
amount of compensatory damages did "not cross the line into the area of constitu-
tional impropriety."). The court held that "imposing exemplary damages on the
corporation when its agent commits intentional fraud creates a strong incentive
for vigilance by those in a position 'to guard substantially against the evil to be
prevented' ... [and therefore] we cannot say this is a violation of Fourteenth
Amendment due process." Id. at 14 (citing Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell,
274 U.S. 112 (1927)). Haslip received one million dollars in punitive relief. See
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 7. Justice Stevens authored the Court's majority opinion, hold-
ing that the 10 million dollar award was not so "grossly excessive" that it required
reversal. See id. at 456. In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined byJus-
tices Souter and White, noted that the Court in Ha slip "held out the promise that
punitive damages awards would receive sufficient constitutional scrutiny to restore
fairness in what is rapidly becoming an arbitrary and oppressive system .... " Id. at
472-73 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Cf TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446-73 (1993) (involving actual damages of $19,000 and puni-
tive damages 526 times larger in a slander of title case).
29. Many other actions can constitute the tort of bad-faith. See Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Hilley, 595 So. 2d 873, 875-77 (Ala. 1992) (fraud); Gourley v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 822 P.2d 374, 377-78 (Cal. 1991) (tortious interference with a
property right); Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A. 2d 1023, 1027-28 (N.H. 1995) (mali-
cious defense); John H. Bauman, Emotional Distress Damages and the Tort of Insurance
Bad-Faith, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 717, 722-28 (1998) (intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Claims Fraud Problems and Remedies, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 907, 942-45 (1992) (libel and slander); Jennifer L. Kauth, Goodbye
Good-faith Doctrine: Constitutional Rights Prevail with the Rejection Of the Leon Good-
faith Exception, 30 IDAHO L. REv. 159, 170-71 (1993) (invasion of privacy); RobertJ.
Newell, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith: Arkansas Employers Are Exposed To Greater Liabil-
ity, 52 ARK. L. REv. 503, 515 (1999) (outrageous conduct) (discussing Liberty Mut.
ins. Co. v. Coleran, 852 S.WA.2d 816 1199311
30. "Consequential damages are the damages which naturally flow from the
breach of a contract, or may reasonably be contemplated by the parties as a prob-
able result of a breach of the contract." Imdieke v. Blenda-Life, Inc., 363 N.W.2d
121,125 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
31. See Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad-Faith in First-Party Insurance Trans-
[Vol. 26:2
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of recovery in the first-party insurance arena to a 1973 California Supreme
Court decision, Gnsenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.32 Despite conflicting views
about the origin of the tort theory, it seems the modern tort standards grew
33
from the Gruenbeig decision.
Gruenberg, in essence, redefined the common-law by allowing a first-
party insured to pursue punitive damages in excess of its policy limitations
under a tort liability scheme.3 Since the Gruenberg decision, a majority of
jurisdictions recognize an insured's ability to recover damages in excess of
35 36
one's contract terms with the insurer under a tort theory of liability.
actions After Two Decades, 37ARIz. L. REv. 1153, 1153 (1995) (advocating for a bal-
ancing of rights and responsibilities between an insurer and insured); see also
Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad-Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions: Refin-
ing the Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 1, 16-26 (1992) (summarizing the tort of bad-faith). But see Wether-
bee v. United Ins. Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 921 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1968) (award-
ing plaintiff $1,050 in contract damages and reversing the court's award of
$500,000 in punitive damages). Wetherbee is an early decision perpetuating the de-
velopment of the tort theory of recovery. See SPENCER L. KIMBALL, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON INSURANCE LAw 499 (1992). Although the court reversed the
amount of the jury's punitive damage award, Judge Shoemaker upheld the plain-
tiff's right to collect some punitive damages on remand to the superior court. See
Wetherbee, 265 Cal. App. 2d at 935. Professor Kimball ponders, "[w]as it sound to
make a tort case out of [such a] straightforward breach of contract?" KIMBALL, at
499.
32. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). See generally William H. Gilardy, Jr., Good-faith
and Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts: Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 25
HASTINGS L.J. 699 (1974) (providing a deep analysis of the Gruenberg decision).
33. But see ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES AND COMMERCIAL PRACTCES 878
(1988) (indicating that the tort theory of recovery has been around for longer
than 1973).
34. Professor Kimball labels this conclusion "unfortunate." See KIMBALL, supra
note 31, at 499.
35. "To date, use of the tort cause of action for bad-faith performance has
been limited primarily to the insurance context...." Mark Snyderman, What's So
Good About Good-faith? The Good-faith Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending,
55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1335, 1362 (1988).
36. See Henderson, The Tort of Bad-Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions Af-
ter Two Decades, supra note 31, at 1153-54. Professor Henderson points out that
twenty-four state courts of last resort have adopted the tort theory of recovery, in-
cluding: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Wisconsin and Wyoming. See id. at 1153-54 (citing Chavers v. National Sec. Fire &
Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 6 (Ala. 1981) ("We recognize the intentional tort of bad-
faith in first-party insurance actions.")); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nich-
olson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1156-57 (Alaska 1989) ("We hold that, in the first-party con-
text, an insured's cause of action against an insurer for breach of the duty of good-
faith and fair dealing sounds in tort."); Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624
P.2d 866, 867-68 (Ariz. 1981) ("We are persuaded that there are sound reasons for
20001
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sons for recognizing the rule announced in Gruenberg."); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Ark. 1984) ("Bad-faith may give rise
to either first or third party claims."); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258,
1271 (Colo. 1985) ("[T]he Workmen's Compensation Act does not bar Savio from
bringing a tort action in state court for damages arising from bad-faith in the
processing of his request for rehabilitation."); Buckman v. People Express, Inc.,
530 A.2d 596, 599 (Conn. 1987) ("[T]his court recognizes an independent cause
of action in tort arising from an insurer's common law duty of good-faith."); White
v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 1019 (Idaho 1986) ("The imposition of
liability in tort for bad-faith breach of an insurance contract is warranted.... .");
Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 622 N.E.2d 515, 518-19 (Ind. 1993) ("[R] ecognition of a
cause of action for the tortious breach of an insurer's duty to deal with its insured
in good-faith is appropriate."); Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d
173, 180 (Ind. 1976) ("Exceptions have developed where the conduct of the
breaching party not only amounts to a breach of the contract, but also independ-
ently establishes the elements of a common-law tort) (emphasis added); Dolan v.
Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1988) ("[W]e are convinced traditional
damages for breach of contract will not always adequately compensate an insured
for an insurer's bad-faith conduct."); Curry v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 784 S.W.2d
176, 178 (Ky. 1989) ("The facts of this case well illustrate the desirability of permit-
ting recovery in tort when an insurance company acts in bad-faith in dealing with
its own insured."); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simpson, 477 So. 2d 242, 249
(Miss. 1985) ("The punitive award was approved because the intentional wrong
was so gross that it merited redress.... ."); Lipinski v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 970,
977 (Mont. 1982) ("IT]he court could as easily have held that the damages flowed
from the commission of the prima facie tort of bad-faith. .. ."); Braesch v. Union
Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 773 (Neb. 1991) ("Accordingly, when the insurer unrea-
sonably and in bad-faith withholds payment of the claim of its insured, it is subject
to liability in tort."); United Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, 780 P.2d 193, 197 (Nev.
1989) ("[T]he district court did not err in admitting Leverty's testimony that
United Fire breached its duty and was liable for bad-faith and punitive damages.");
State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 527 P.2d 798, 800 (N.M. 1974) ("In order to
recover damages in a tort action under the facts in this case, there must be evi-
dence of bad-faith .... ."); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins.
Co., 279 N.W.2d 638, 643 (N.D. 1979) ("Where... [the insurer] fails to deal fairly
and in good-faith with its insured by refusing, without proper cause, to compensate
its insured for a loss covered by the policy, such conduct may give rise to a cause of
action in tort for breach of an implied covenant of good-faith and fair dealing.")
(emphasis added); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1319 (Ohio
1983) ("The key issue presented is whether appellees have sufficiently pleaded a
cause of action in tort, stemming from the refusal of their insurer to pay their
claim, to allow them to proceed on a punitive damages claim against their in-
surer."); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 904 (Okla.
1978) ("We approve and adopt the rule that an insurer has an implied duty to deal
fairly and act in good-faith with its insured and that the violation of this duty gives
rise to an action in tort for which consequential and, in a proper case, punitive,
damages may be sought."); Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co.. 417 A.2d 313, 319 (R.I.
1980) ("[T]his duty sounds in contract as well as in tort. . . ."); Nichols v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616, 618-19 (S.C. 1983) ("[U]nreasonable
refusal on the insurer's part to accept an offer of compromise[d] settlement will
render it liable in tort to the insured.... ."); In re Certification of a Question of
Law, 399 N.W.2d 320, 324 (S.D. 1987) ("[A]n insurer's violation of its duty of
[Vol. 26:2
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1. The Gruenberg Decision
The facts of Gruenberg are, perhaps, the most shocking and evident of
an insurer's bad-faith breach reported to date.37 The insured owned a Los
Angeles cocktail lounge insured by the respondent. 8 After a fire oc-
curred, a member of the Los Angeles Fire Department confronted the in-
sured and arrested him for arson. Subsequently, the insurer's claims ad-
juster visited the site and reported the insured had excessive policy40
coverage. Consequently, the state charged the insured with arson and
defrauding his insurer.
One month later, the insurer's attorney demanded that the insured
submit to an examination under oath and produce documents relating to
the fire. 42 The insured's lawyer responded, explaining that the insured
would not make statements concerning the fire while criminal charges
43
were pending. In response, the insurer advised that they were denying
liability for the insured's failure to submit to the examination. 44
Eventually, the state dropped all charges for lack of probable cause.
The insured ultimately volunteered for the examination. However, the
insurer reaffirmed its assertion that it was denying coverage for failure to
47
appear.
The insured brought suit, claiming that "[a] s a direct and proximate
result of the outrageous conduct and bad-faith of the [insurer] ... I have
suffered severe economic damage, severe emotional upset and distress,
loss of earnings and various special damages."48 The insured sought both
49
compensatory and punitive damages, contending he plead a sufficient
cause of action in tort for the breach of the implied duty of good-faith and
good-faith and fair dealing constitutes a tort, even though it is also a breach of
contract."); McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 856-60 (Wyo.
1990) ("To deny an action in tort would deny such recovery and consequently en-
courage insurers to delay settlement."). However, "the tort created by Nichols is
expressly preempted when the bad-faith claim arises under an employee benefit
plan." Duncan v. Provident Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 427 S.E.2d 657, 658 (S.C. 1993)
(involving a bad-faith ERISA claim).
37. See generally Gruenberg; 510 P.2d at 1034-1035.
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fair dealing. 50 The insured's claim, therefore, sounded in tort and con-
51
tract.
The court held the insurer's conduct toward the insured was "uncon-
scionable and constituted a tortious breach of contract. " 52 The court ex-
plained that the duty violated by the insured, namely good-faith and fair53
dealing, is imposed by law, and nonconsensual in origin. The court
found that the insurer willfully and maliciously constructed a scheme to
deprive the insured of the benefits of this policy by encouraging criminal
charges through surreptitiously suggesting that the insurer was motivated
54
to commit arson. Further, the court noted that the existence of a con-
tractual relationship did not insulate the insurer from liability placed
upon tortfeasors intervening with a property interest of the insured in re-
ceiving the benefits of his bargain.5 5 Even though the insurer's duty arose
from a contractual relationship with the insured, the court stated that
such a duty is independent of performance of [an insurer's] contractual ob-
ligations. 56 Hence, the court concluded, the duty sounds in tort, notwith-
57standing the fact that the insurer breached the contract.
2. The Anderson Decision
Scholars have implied that Gruenberg, while reaching a worthy con-
clusion, is vague and unguiding.5 One author believes the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, in Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co.,59 decided five
years after Gruenberg, "took the lead ... by articulating a more detailed...
standard. " °
Like Gruenberg, Anderson involved an insurer's refusal to pay an in-
sured for losses suffered because of a fire.6 ' In deciding the case, the An-
50. See id. at 1036.
51. See id. at 1037.
52. Id.
53. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
54. See Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1038.
55. See id. at 1040.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 1037.
58. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
59. 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
60. See Henderson, The Tort of Bad-Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions Af-
ter Two Decades, supra note 31, at 1157; see alsoJohnny C. Parker, Does Lack of an In-
surable Interest Preclude an Insurance Agent from Taking an Absolute Assignment of His
Client's Life Policy?, 31 U. RicH. L. REV. 71, 104 n.111 (1997) ("The Anderson stan-
dard is more s ge - U + .-.. . .t.....^ U -. 4 U.._..... .... ..... ...  a u.u~a. .u 0 7  tAC C..ai-xoIlur la S-LII-efuieI C--uO rt' ill
Grunberg.-).
61. See Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 371. In Anderson, the insureds owned a home
in Milwaukee. See id. They obtained an insurance policy from the defendant, pro-
viding coverage for loss occasioned by "fire, lightning, explosion, or smoke." See
id. While the policy was in effect, the insureds discovered that the "walls, carpet-
[Vol. 26:2
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Anderson court first disposed of the "tortious breach of contract" label
placed on the cause of action by the Gruenberg court.62 The Anderson court
noted that such a label is "confusing" and "inappropriate" because it
might lead practitioners to believe that the wrongful act sounds in con-
tract, thereby denying a claimant punitive damages.
Second, the Anderson court explored the rationale for the separate
tortious act relating to the breach of an insurance contract.64 The court
adopted the findings of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Hilker v. Western
Automobile Insurance Co.,65 decided nearly fifty years prior. In Hilker, the
court found the duty of an insurance company comparable to that of a fi-
duciary.67
Finally, the court redefined the elements required for a bad-faith
claim based in tort law.6 In demonstrating a claim for bad-faith, an in-
sured must show "[1] the absence of a reasonable basis for denying [the]
benefits of the policy and [2] the [insurer's] knowledge or reckless disre-
gard for the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim."
70
Apparently, courts in the aforementioned jurisdictions have adopted
the tort approach as a matter of public policy.7 ' Central to their decision,
courts furnish what they discern as an adequate remedy for an insured
ing, furniture, draperies, and clothing in the house were covered with an oil and
smoke residue, which, allegedly, resulted from a fire or an explosion in the fur-
nace." Id. The following day, the insureds notified their insurer. See id. The in-
sureds alleged that the insurer, and its agents, "refused to negotiate in good-faith
concerning the amount of payment, and that each of them submitted offers in set-
dement which were completely unrealistic." Id. at 372. The insureds alleged that
the consistent refusal of the insurer to negotiate in good-faith was "done with the
knowledge and design of avoiding the obligations under the insurance contract."
Id. Specifically, they claimed that the conduct of both the insurer and its agent
was "fraudulent, intentional, and in bad-faith and for the purpose of discouraging,
avoiding, or reducing the payment due under the terms of the policy." See id.
62. See id. at 374.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 374-75.
65. 235 N.W. 413, 415 (Wis. 1931).
66. See Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 374.
67. See Hilker, 235 N.W. at 415.
68. See Daniel S. Bopp, Tort and Contract in Bad-Faith Cases: Is the Honeymoon
Over?, 59 DEF. CouNs. J. 524, 527 (1992) (discussing the limited defenses available
for a first-party bad-faith claim).
69. See Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 376-77.
70. Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
71. See supra notes 58-70; see alsoJames M. Fischer, Why are Insurance Contracts
Subject To Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIz. ST. LJ. 995,
1013-15 (1992) (discussing the consequences and judicial reaction to insurance
contracts as "adhesion" contracts). Fischer characterizes the "tort" approach as a
'public policy approach." Id. at 1015; see also Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d
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72
wronged by an insurer's defiance. These courts fear that absent such a
standard, first-party insurers acting in bad-faith may be liable only for• 73
damages equal to the maximum payout provided by the relevant policy.
B. The Contract Theory of Recovery
Judicial remedies serve to protect the expectation interest of a pro-
misee,7 4 meaning his or her interest in having the benefit of the bargain
by being placed in as good a position as he or she would have been had75
the contract been fully performed. The measure of damages for breach
of an insurance contract has typically been limited to the lesser of the pol-
icy amount or the extent of the insurable loss. 76 In recent times, however,
courts have applied the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale7 7 in the insurance
arena, and acknowledged an insured's right to recover consequential
72. See Fischer, supra note 71, at 1013. Fischer cautions, however, that "the
pro-insured bias may amount to excessive correction." Id. at 1014.
73. See Beck, 701 P.2d at 798-99 (discussing cases which discuss courts' fears);
see also Harvey & Wiseman, supra note 5, at 158 (citing the limitation of recovery to
the insurance policy under contract theory); Savage, supra note 14, at 168 (show-
ing differences in recovery between the contract and tort theories).
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981); CHARLEs L.
KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAw 893 (3d ed. 1993). The
authors note that the drafters of the Restatement (Second) adopted the principles
proposed by Professor Lon Fuller and his associate William Perdue in section 344.
See id. at 893. In 1936, Fuller and Perdue advanced the thesis that there are three
basic interests the law should seek to protect in fashioning remedies for breach of
contract. See id. at 892.
75. See KNAPP & CRYSTAL, supra note 75, at 892.
76. See Agee, supra note 1, at 145 (citing Clark v. Life & Cas. Co., 53 S.W.2d
968, 969 (Ky. 1932)). The Minnesota Supreme Court recently applied this stan-
dard to innocent insureds. See Hogs Unlimited v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 401
N.W.2d 381, 387 (Minn. 1987) ("[I]nnocent insured partners may recover their
proportionate interest under the insurance policy for intentional destruction of
their partnership property interest.").
77. 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 145 (1854). The rule ofHadleyv. Baxendale has been
nearly universally accepted. See, e.g., James Ulicny, Note, Corl v. Huron Castings,
Inc.: Wrongful Discharge and the Collateral Source Rule 1997 DET. C.L. REv. 273, 301
(1997) (discussing the widespread acceptance of the rule expressed in Hadley v.
Baxendale). Actually, there are two "rules" of Hadley. See Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at
145. A plaintiff suing for breach of contract may recover only damages which ei-
ther: (1) arise naturally from the breach of contract itself, or (2) arise from the
special circumstances under which the contract was actually made, if communi-
cated by the plaintiff to the defendant. See id. But see Thomas A. Diamond &
Howard Foss. Coni'qu'ntia1Daragesfo Com"..er.za Lss A A 1t.ativC ... Hadley v.
Baxendale, 63 FORDHA L. REV. 665, 665 (1994) (concluding that the application
of a single, inflexible standard for contract liability, irrespective of the surround-
ing circumstances, is a fundamentally flawed approach); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REV. 563, 563 (1992) (arguing that
contract law is now ready to substitute for the regime of Hadley).
[Vol. 26:2
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damages beyond general damages.
Several jurisdictions outside of Minnesota accept the "foreseeability"
standard in supporting awards of consequential, as opposed to punitive,
damages in first-party bad-faith cases.79 For example, the highest courts of
80 81 82 83 84
Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, Utah, and West Virginia have
expressly recognized the right to recover extra-contractual damages under
some expanded version of the rules proscribing damages for breach of13"5 - 86
contract. At the federal level, the First and Sixth Circuits have adopted
the contract theory of recovery.
1. The Lawton Decision
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, the first to invoke such logic,
broke away from the Gruenberg mode of thinking in 1978. The court
crafted a contract theory of recovery in response to a first-party insurer's
bad-faith breach of first-party insurance contract in Lawton v. Great South-
western Fire Insurance Co.s T The basic facts of Lawton mirror closely those in88 . 89
California's Gruenberg decision, sounding in tort, as well as the Shimer
78. See infra text accompanying notes 82-88.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 89-137.
80. See Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254, 254 (Del.
1995) (involving insureds who brought action against insurer for bad-faith delay in
paying underinsured motorist benefits).
81. See Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644, 644 (Me. 1993)
("Insureds brought action against fire insurer for breach of contract, statutory in-
terest and attorneys fees, breach of fiduciary duty and bad-faith.").
82. See Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581-82 (N.H. 1978)
(holding that mental distress damages are not typically recoverable in a contract
action); see also Drop Anchor Realty Trust v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 496 A.2d 339,
344 (N.H. 1985) (involving an insured motel owner who brought action against
his property insurer for alleged bad-faith by failing to settle the insured's claim for
property damage following a blizzard); Jarvis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 448
A.2d 407, 409 (N.H. 1982) (reaffirming the rule expressed in Lawton).
83. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985).
84. See Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W. Va.
1986).
85. See deVries v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 716 F.2d 939, 942 (1st Cir.
1983) (citing Lawton, 392 A.2d at 576).
86. See Salamay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 741 F.2d 874, 876 (6th Cir. 1984). Like the
court in Lawton, the Sixth Circuit did not restrict the damages owed an insured to
the terms of the insured's policy. See id.; see also Bob G. Freemon, Reasonable and
Foreseeable Damages for Breach of an Insurance Contract, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 108, 108
(1985) (describing and identifying the "battle" as insurers seeking ways to protect
themselves from potentially limitless liability as insureds pursue financial punish-
ment they feel insurers deserve).
87. 392 A.2d 576 (N.H. 1978).
88. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Cal. 1973).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 38-58.
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decision of the Ninth Judicial District of Minnesota. 0
In Lawton, the plaintiff sought damages against his insurance com-
pany for its failure to make payment of a fire loss pursuant to a fire insur-• 91
ance policy. In the three counts raised against his insurer, the plaintiff
sought consequential damages totaling $500,000 because of the "irrepara-
ble damage to the plaintiff's business ... loss of use of his property, loss of
business opportunity, [and] additional damage to the property occa-
sioned by the [insurer's] delay."
9 2
The trial court dismissed the insured's claim to the extent he sought
damages exceedin his policy limits, holding the policy limits cap an in-
sured's remedies. However, in a well-reasoned opinion by Justice Brock,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed.94
Beyond the dama es analysis, the court considered the insured's
counts sounding in tort. It noted that the insured sought to "plead a tort
claim for what [was] essentially a breach of contract."'- The court was at-97
tentive to the majority trend towards awards of tort damages. Still, it re-. 98
jected the tort theory in favor of consequential relief.
Among the many reasons the Lawton court gave for allowing an in-
sured to collect consequential damages in excess of his policy limits, three
particular pieces of reasoning stand out. First, the Lawton court noted
that the policy limits contained in the parties' contract restricted the
amount the insurer was obligated to pay in the performance of the contract,
as opposed to the damages recoverable should the insurer breach.99 Next,
the court pointed out that the principal reason a hotel owner, such as the
insured, would initially purchase fire insurance is to guard against the• 100
consequences of a fire, namely financial distress. Finally, the court rea-
soned that limiting an insurer's liability to the terms of the policy limit
unnecessarily encourages insurers to delay settlement in an attempt to co-
erce a financially pressured claimant into accepting an unfair settle-101
ment.
90. See Shimer v. United Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. C5-98-64 (D. Minn. March
5, 1999).
91. See Lawton, 392 A.2d at 577.
92. Id. at 578.
93. See id. at 578. This is the problematic issue courts adopting the tort ap-
proach try to correct. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
94. Lawton, 392 A.2d at 580.
95. See id. at 580-81.
96. Id. at 580.
97. Id.; see also Henderson, The Tort of Bad-Faith in First-Party Insurance Transac-
.ion. At 0- TWO Decades, sura note 31, aitt 1153 (citing cases adopting the tort stan-
dard).
98. See Lawton, 392 A.2d at 580.
99. See id. at 579.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 579-80; see also Freemon, supra note 87, at 108 (noting that the
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The Lawton court concluded by holding, simply, that "allegations of
an insurer's wrongful refusal or delay [in] settl[ing] a first-party [insur-
ance] claim do[es] not state a cause of action in tort. Yet, the court
placed an interesting spin on the rule: if the facts constituting the breach
of contract also constitute a breach of the duty owed by an insurer to an
insured, independent of a written agreement, an insured may dip one's
hand in the tort bucket.
10 3
2. The Beck Decision
The cases discussed supra deal with insured real property. However,
it appears contract theory principles flow through the veins of automobile
insurance, thanks to a relatively recent decision by the Utah Supreme
Court. 104
In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, a no-fault dispute arose out of
the plaintiffs hit-and-run automobile accident.1 5 The plaintiff injured his
knee in a car accident and received a small settlement on a no-fault
claim.'0 6 When the plaintiff demanded his uninsured motorist policy lim-
its, the insurer rejected the claim without explanation. 107 After months of
unsuccessful negotiation with his insurer, the plaintiff sued alleging a
breach of the implied covenant of good-faith and fair dealing.18
Initially, the court, as in Lawton, recognized that a majority of states
permit a first-party insured to institute a tort action against their insurer... .. 109
when the insurer fails to bargain in good-faith. Through a demeaning
critique of the tort theory, the court decided to award damages based
on a contract theory of recovery."'
In embracing the contract theory, the court proclaimed it was not
ignoring the essential policy considerations driving the adoption of the
tort approach. The court expressly recognized the need to provide rem-
field of insurance defense law has been "extensively altered" through the evolution
of multiple, inconsistent theories of an insured's right to recovery); Mark E. Lish,
Insurers Have a Common Law Duty To Deal Fairly and in Good-Faith with Their Insureds:
Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.
1987), 19 TEx. TEcH L. REv. 1163, 1172-73 (1988) (discussing the Lawton decision
and its rejection of a cause of action in tort for bad-faith conduct of an insurer in
first-party situations).
102. Lawton, 392 A.2d at 581.
103. See id. at 579-80.
104. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
105. See Beck, 701 P.2d at 796.
106. See id. at 796.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 797.
109. See id. at 798.
110. See id. at 799; see infra notes 210-217 and accompanying text.
111. See Beck, 701 P.2d at 798.
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edy exposure exceeding policy limits, thereby reducing the incentive to-- -- 112
act in bad-faith. Thus, they held insurer damages are not limited to the
dollars recoverable under the policy terms.113
In adopting the contract approach, Justice Zimmerman explained
that damages recoverable for a breach include those that are general and114
consequential He offered a detailed explanation of why the contract
theory is the proper theory.
He reasoned that as parties to a contract, both the insured and the
insurer have parallel obligations to perform in good-faith, which inhere in
every contractual relationship and cannot be waived.15 The court, echo-
ing the rule proposed by the court in Lawton, noted that nothing inherent
in contract law mandates a narrow definition limiting damages recover-. .. 116
able to the policy limit. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that consequential damages for breach of contract may reach• 117
beyond the bare contract terms. 7The court concluded that because the
insured essentially bargained for performance of the contract, the insurer
had an obligation to perform its duty.1 8 Therefore, the insurer would be
liable for damages suffered in consequence of a breach.119
3. The Hayseeds Decision
One year later, the highest court of West Virginia adopted the stan-
dards proposed in Beck and Lawton. In Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty, the plaintiff purchased a fire policy from the defendant. 12 Sub-.... 121
sequently, a fire ripped through the interior of the plaintiffs restaurant.122
The insurer initiated an investigation, which revealed arson. The in-
surer refused to pay because the insured alleged that the plaintiff set the
restaurant ablaze. The jury, however, disagreed, and found no evidence
that the insured was an arsonist. 124 Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought pu-





117. See id. at 801-802 (citing Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem., 325 P.2d 906, 907 (Utah 1958) (stating that attorney fees incurred for set-
fling and defending claims were foreseeable result of contractor's default)); Bevan
v. J.H. Constr. Co., 669 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1983) (stating that home purchasers
were entitled to damages for loss of favorable mortgage interest rate resulting
from builder's breach of contract).
118. See Beck, 701 P.2d at 800.
119.&ci.a 80~Q1.
120. See 352 S.E.2d 73, 75 (W. Va. 1986).
121. See id. at 75.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 75-76.
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nitive damages1 5 and attorneys' fees for the insurer's failure to make a
"fair, good-faith investigation of the facts and circumstances surrounding
the fire."
126
Early in its opinion, the Supreme Court of West Virginia addressed
the punitive damages sought by the insured.127 The court stated that,
"[g]enerally, punitive damages are unavailable in an action for breach of
contract unless the conduct of the [insurer] constitutes an independent, in-
tentional tort. "12  Consequently, punitive damages for failure to settle a
property dispute will not be granted to an insured, unless the policyholder
can establish "actual malice in the settlement process. " i 29 Because the Hay-
seeds insured failed to present evidence of malice, the court denied puni-
tive damages and reversed the state district court's punitive award of
$50,000.1'
In considering an award of consequential, as opposed to punitive, dam-
ages, the Hayseeds court fashioned two important public policy consid-
erations not pronounced by the New Hampshire or Utah Supreme Court.
The court seemed to consider the implications for the insurer and in-
sured, as well as the community in which insured property may be located.
First, the court pronounced that insurance contracts are qualitatively dif-152
ferent from other types of contracts, and therefore warrant special ex-
amination and standards. Second, the court noted that one major advan-
tage of adopting the contract theory is that it encourages a quick 
trial;1 33
there is little reason, according to Justice Neely, that property damage.... 134
claims cannot be tried within six months. After pronouncing that an
insured does not purchase a contract of insurance for "a lot of vexatious,
125. If Professor Kimball is correct, this move was an attempt by the plaintiff to
persuade the West Virginia Supreme Court to adopt the tort theory of liability. See
KiMBALL, supra note 31, at 499. The court, however, declined the plaintiff's invita-
tion. See Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 81.
126. Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 76.
127. See id. at 80.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. Id. (emphasis added). The court considers this an altitudinous threshold
and burden for an insured to meet. See id. "Malice," according to the court, exists
when an insurer knows the policyholder's demand is suitable, but the insurer "will-
fully, maliciously, and intentionally" controverts the claim. Id. at 80.
130. See id. at 81.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 28 and 30 (discussing the relationship
between punitive and consequential damages).
132. See Hayseeds, 350 S.E.2d at 77. The court notes that in the context of an
insured business structure, "Not only do policyholders rely upon insurance poli-
cies, but a host of third-party creditors rely upon those policies as well." Id. at 77.
Moreover, the court notes that "[a] lack of immediate rebuilding may cost the
company a significant portion of its skilled employees and may cause employees
the loss of their jobs, pensions, and seniority." Id. at 78.
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time consuming [and] expensive litigation with [the] insurer," the
court concluded that "the insurer... contracted to defend the insured
and failed to do so. It guessed wrong as to its duty, and should be com-
pelled to bear the consequences thereof " '36
In sum, courts endorsing the contract theory allow consequential
damage awards in excess of an insured's policy limits. For example, an
insured may recover net income loss because of an insurer's bad-faith
breach as long as such losses were reasonably foreseeable by the parties at
the time of contract formation. Simultaneously, punitive damages do not
exist under the contract theory, absent an independent tort.
III. PREDICTING MINNESOTA'S APPROACH
Whether Minnesota courts will allow an insured's remedy in contract
or tort is not as obvious as California, Wisconsin, Utah or West Virginia.
Yet, Minnesota appellate courts have dealt with issues very similar to the
issues discussed in the Gruenberg, Anderson, Beck, and Hayseeds decisions
over the last century. Several pronouncements by the Minnesota Supreme
Court line up with those of jurisdictions that favor tort recovery. Yet, the
court often sounds as though it is in favor of the contract approach.
Therein lies the essential question posed by this article: Is Minnesota apt
to become a tort or contract state?
A. Minnesota Decisions Inferring the Contract Theory
The contract theory of recovery seems alive in some Minnesota ap-
pellate decisions. Most of the relevant language that indicates that the
contract theory is preferred stems from decisions crafted in the last two
decades. However, many of the modern principles stem from some early
contract cases.
1. The Whittaker and Independent Grocery Decisions
As early as 1885, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a standard
resembling the modern contract theory. The Minnesota Supreme Court
in Whittaker v. Collins,137 squarely framed the issue as "what rule applies in
what are sometimes called actions for torts founded on contracts or ac-
135. Id. at 79.
136. Id. (quoting 7 CJ. APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4691 at 282-
83 (Berdal ed., 1979)).
137. 34 Minn. 299, 25 N.W. 632 (Minn. i885). Whittaker involved an action for
damages caused by the alleged negligence and unskillfulness of a physician and
surgeon. See Whittaker, 34 Minn. at 299, 25 N.W. at 632. After breaking his leg, the
plaintiff employed the defendant to care and treat him. See id. at 300, 25 N.W. at
632. The court determined that the defendant caused the plaintiffs injuries. See
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tions ex quasi contractua?" 8 The court answered by stating:
The principle running through all the cases seems to be that
where the action is maintainable for the tort simply, without
reference to any contract between the parties, the action is one
of tort purely, although the existence of a contract may have
been the occasion or furnished the opportunity for committing
the tort. But where the action is not maintainable without
pleading and proving the contract,-where the gist of the action
is the breach of the contract, either by malfeasance or nonfea-
sance, -it is, in substance, whatever may be the form of the
pleading, an action on the 
contract ....
Thirty-five years later, the Minnesota Supreme Court revisited the is-
sues presented in Whittaker within the context of a first-party insurance
dispute. In Independent Grocery Co. v. Sun Insurance Co., the plaintiff
brought an action seeking consequential damages for the insurer's al-
leged "malicious and wrongful delay of defendants in adjusting the insur-
ance loss complained of."'4  The court dealt with two questions: First, did
the claim present a claim sounding in tort or contract? Second, was the
plaintiff entitled to the damages sought?
14
3
Foremost, the court upheld the standard enunciated in Whittaker, as
well as the rule(s)' 44 of Hadly v. Baxendale,145 by stating that a complaint
alleging damages from malicious delay in settlement and payment of in-146
surance states a breach of contract action. Next, the court held no
damages were recoverable because:
Neither the loss of trade nor the inability of plaintiffs to pay
their creditors, or even that they were likely to have creditors in
the event of a destruction of the insured property by fire, or the
loss of the good will of the business, flowed naturally or proxi-
mately from the delay of defendants in adjusting and paying the
138. Id. at 300, 25 N.W at 632-33.
139. Id. at 300, 25 N.W at 633.
140. 146 Minn. 214, 178 N.W. 582 (Minn. 1920).
141. Id. The plaintiffs owned a grocery store insured by the defendant. See id.
at 215, 178 N.W. at 582. After sustaining losses as a result of a fire, notice of the
loss was duly given to the insurer. See id. Negotiations resulted in a settlement in
which the insurer agreed to pay $1,100 in full discharge of its liability. See id. The
insurer delayed payment, which resulted in further alleged losses to the plaintiffs
business. See id. at 215, 178 N.W. at 582-83.
142. See id. at 216, 178 N.W. at 583.
143. See id. at 217, 178 N.W. at 583.
144. See supra text accompanying note 79.
145. 145 Eng. Rep. 145, 145 (1854).
146. See Independent Grocery Co., 34 Minn. at 216,178 N.W. at 583.
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loss; nor can it be said that the financial condition and business
situation of plaintiffs as pictured by the complaint was within
the contemplation of the parties when the contract was entered
into. Those facts therefore furnish no basis for the recovery of
damages, for as to the breach of the contract, whether malicious
or not, plaintiffs' recovery, within the rule stated, must be limited
to the amount of the legal liability under the policy with interest.
1 4 7
The Independent Grocery opinion remained untouched for the better
part of the twentieth century.
2. The Olson Decision
In 1979 the Minnesota Supreme Court overruled Independent Grocery.
The Court in Olson v. Ruglosk a4s did so, however, only "to the extent
that... [the court in] Independent Grocery... h [eld] that an insured is lim-
ited to recovering only the amount of the policy.", 49 Thus, as an initial
proposition, the Minnesota Supreme Court has not expressly disposed of
the early contract theory of first-party insured recovery enunciated in In-
dependent Grocery. It has merely added an element to the rule: consequen-
tial damages may exceed policy limits. 5 0  5
The Olson case involved a first-party insurance dispute. The in-
surer appealed ajudgment of the Ramsey County district court awarding a
plaintiff $35,000 in punitive damages and $7,500 in compensatory relief.
The lower court held that the defendant insurer engaged in willful, wan-
ton, and malicious refusal to pay proceeds. 1
s
Reversing in part, the Olson court held that lost profits might be re-
covered if they are a natural and proximate result of the breach and are
proved with reasonable certainty. Does this assertion sound a little like
the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale? Absolutely. Hence, without little argu-
ment, it seems the Olson court adopted a "contract" mode of thinking.
Not only has the Minnesota Supreme Court retained the rule pro-
147. Id. at 217, 178 N.W. at 583. (emphasis added).
148. 277 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1979).
149. See id. at 388.
150. See id. at 388.
151. See id. at 386.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 388. The Olson court affirmed the trial court's award of compen-
satory damages totaling $7,500. See id. However, the court reversed the $35,000
punitive damage award. See id.
155. One author believes that the Olson decision indicates a shift toward a less
constrained view of consequential damages stemming from the breach of a first-
party insurance agreement. See Freemon, supra note 87, at 108 ("A majority of
states have adopted the concept, in its myriad of forms and applications, that an
insurer owes a duty of good-faith and fair dealing to its insured.").
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posed by Chief Justice Brown's Independent Grocery opinion, but it has im-
plicitly embraced the principle in its reasoning in Olson, Chief Justice
Wahl's opinion in Olson echoes the spirit of the highest courts of Dela-... . .. 156
ware, Maine, New Hampshire, Utah, West Virginia, found 
in Tackett,
57.158 159 160
Lawton,1-7 Marquis, Beck, and Hayseeds respectively; each of these
courts has adopted the contract theory of recovery 
in specie.
Since the Olson decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court has em-
braced the rule that insurance policies are contracts and, unless there are
statutory laws to contrary, general principles of contract law apply, on at
least four occasions.
3. The Haagenson Decision
In 1979, the Minnesota Supreme Court disposed of the key feature of
the tort theory of recovery in first-party bad-faith: punitive damages. In
156. See Tackett v. State Farm Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254, 254 (Del. 1995).
157. See Lawton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 576, 576 (N.H.
1978).
158. See Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644, 644 (Me. 1993).
159. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 795 (Utah 1983).
160. See Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73, 73 (W. Va.
1986).
161. See supra notes 89-137 and accompanying text. For example, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in Lawton held that:
Defendant's argument that the insurance contract itself restricts the
damages that are recoverable for breach of the contract to the policy lim-
its is... unpersuasive. The policy limits restrict the amount the insurer
may have to pay in the performance of the contract, not the damages that
are recoverable for its breach.
Lawton, 392 A.2d at 579 (emphasis added). Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme
Court in Hayseeds noted, "when a policyholder substantially prevails in a property
damage suit against an insurer, the policyholder is entitled to damages for net
economic loss caused by the delay in settlement, as well as an award for aggrava-
tion and inconvenience." Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 80. Analogously, the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Olson stated that "[w] hen the insurer refuses to pay or unrea-
sonably delays payment of an undisputed amount, it breaches the contract and is
liable for the loss that naturally and proximately flows from the breach." Olson v.
Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Minn. 1979) (citing Frank v.Jensen, 303 Minn. 86,
92, 226 N.W.2d 739, 745 (1975)).
162. See Vetter v. Security Continental Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn.
1997) (involving a claim for breach of annuity contracts); Epland v. Meade Ins.
Agency Assoc. Inc., 564 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn. 1997) (involving a breach of con-
tract suit against a medical insurer); Waseca Mut. Ins. Co. v. Noska, 331 N.W.2d
917, 926 (Minn. 1983) (discussing the interaction between an insured's no-fault
automobile benefits and her homeowner's insurance policy); St. Paul Sch. Dist.
No. 625 v. Columbia Transit Corp., 321 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. 1982) (involving the
automobile liability insurance policy of a school bus company).
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Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co.,16 3 the plaintiff
sustained injuries in an auto accident and filed a claim for no-fault bene-
fits.'r 4 The insurer denied coverage. 165 In district court, the jury deter-
mined the insurer breached the good-faith obligation by acting with mal-
ice in denying the plaintiffs benefits.166 The jury awarded $60,000 in no-
fault benefits through stacking the plaintiff's policies.167 Additionally, the
jury awarded the plaintiff $50,000 for emotional distress and an additional
$300,000 in punitive damages. 168
On appeal, Justice Peterson announced, "[a] malicious or bad-faith
motive in breaching a contract does not convert a contract action into a
tort acon.6 Thus, the plaintiff was not entitled to the extra-contractual
damages at issue.'70 Hence, the court adopted a standard similar to the
Lawton decision sounding in contract. Moreover, the Haagenson court an-
nounced that extra-contractual relief is possible in first-party insurance
disputes, assuming an independent tort accompanies the breach.'7 ' Again,
this language squares well with the contract-based analysis provided in
Lawton.
4. The Saltou Decision
Seven years post Olson and Haagenson, the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals revisited first-party bad-faith issues. In Saltou v. Dependable Insurance
Co., Inc.,'7 fire destroyed an insured's mobile home.' 73 After a number of
payment requests, the insurer issued proceeds under the policy ten weeks
post-fire.1 74 The insurer's agent denied coverage for personal property175
loss, and eventually wrote the check to the wrong party. After the in-
surer ultimately withheld payment, the insured was hospitalized for emo-
tional trouble.
After commencing an action for breach of contract and intentional
163. 277 N.W.2d 648, 648 (Minn. 1979).
164. Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 277 N.W.2d,
648, 650 (Minn. 1979).
165. See id. at 651.
166. See id. at 650.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 652 (citing Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 442, 234 N.W.2d 775, 790
(Minn. 1975) (offering guidance on the relationship between a bad-faith breach
of contract and tort damages)).
170. Id. at 650.
171. .See Ld. at C-55.
172. 394 N.W.2d 629, 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
173. See id. at 631.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 631-32.
176. See id. at 632.
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infliction of emotional distress, the lower court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the insurer. On appeal, Judge Randall announced that
the plaintiff could only recover punitive damages if the breach was ac-
companied by an independent tort. 78 Such language is consistent with
Lawton, Olson, and Haagenson, sounding in contract, as is the court's pro-
nouncement that "[tihe failure to pay an insurance claim in itself, no mat-
ter how malicious, does not constitute a tort."' 79
Not only did the Saltou court implicitly dispose of the tort theory of
recovery, but it supported the contract theory by noting that "[w] hen the
insurer refuses to pay or unreasonably delays payment of an undisputed
amount, it breaches the contract and is liable for the loss that naturally
and proximately flows from the breach. " 18s Such a rule parallels the hold-
ing in Hayseeds and Beck, where both rules sound in contract.
5. The Pillsbury Decision
A Minnesota appellate court more recently adopted first-party bad-
faith occurred in Pillsbury Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.'8 1 The
Pillsbuy case, as may be inferred from the name, involved what some
scholars refer to as a "sophisticated insured."' 2 In 1983, an insurer issued
Pillsbury a "Products Integrity Impairment Loss of Revenue and Product
Recall Extra Expense Insurance Policy." l ss Under the terms of the agree-
ment, the insured paid an annual premium of $280,000 for insurance
coverage totaling $150 million.1s 4
In 1985, the insured suffered a claimed loss exceeding $70 million.8 5
After settlement negotiations failed, the insurer denied the claim alleging
misrepresentation in procuring coverage and a failure to cooperate dur-
ing the investigation of the claim. Pillsbury brought suit, claiming the
insurer breached its contract in bad-faith. Pillsbury sought punitive
damages.188
177. See id.
178. See id. at 633.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Olson v. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Minn. 1979)).
181. 425 N.W.2d 244, 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
182. See KIMBALL, supra note 31, at 27. Professor Kimball considers a sophisti-
cated insured as one that is "[a] large [and] economically powerful [business]."
Id.
183. See Pillsbury, 425 N.W.2d at 244. The policy intended to serve the food
industry and protect against the adverse effects associated with negative publicity
that might stem from the discovery of toxins in a product. See id. at 246-47.
184. See id. at 246.
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As in Olson, the court stated, "[a] n insurance policy is a contract, the
terms of which determine the rights and obligations of the contractingS ,189
parties." The court affirmed its belief that the rule of Hadley v. Baxen-
dale, naturally sounding in contract, applied by stating "[t ] he damages re-
coverable for breach of a contract are such as either arise naturally from
the breach itself or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been con-
templated by the parties when making the contract as the probable result
of the breach. Moreover, the court cited the Saltou and Haagenson de-
cisions for their holdings, both sounding in contract.
B. Minnesota Decisions Inferring the Tort Theory
Several Minnesota decisions indicate that the Minnesota courts may
willingly adopt the tort approach to extra-contractual recovery if they rec-
ognize first-party bad-faith. None of these decisions offer the kind of ex-
press language provided in the Gruenberg and Anderson decisions sounding
in tort. However, close scrutiny of the reasoning proffered in, ironically,192
Olson and Pillsbury, as well as R-L.B., suggests that the Minnesota Su-
preme Court might consider the tort theory a viable option. Additionally,
193several leading scholars explicitly consider Minnesota a tort state.
1. The Olson Decision Cited in the Pillsbury Decision
Recall that Olson involved a first-party insured that brought action• 194
against his insurer for failure to pay benefits owed under the policy. In
reversing the lower court, Chief Justice Wahl in Olson held "punitive dam-
ages are not recoverable ... except in exceptional cases where the breach
of contract (1) constitutes or is (2) accompanied by an independent
189. See id. at 248 (citing Olson v. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Minn.
1979)).
190. Id. (citing Francis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 260, 59 N.W.
1078, 1079 (Minn. 1894)).
191. The Minnesota Court of Appeals constructed an analysis similar to the
one constructed in the Pillsbury decision in Cherne Contracting Corp. v. Wasau
Ins. Co., 572 N.W.2d 339, 339 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). In Cherne, the court ad-
dressed a first-party insured's claim that its insurer breached the good-faith obliga-
tion. See id. at 341. In declining to adopt the bad-faith tort doctrine,Judge Harten
stated "[w]hile Minnesota courts have recognized that an insurer owes a duty of
good-faith, such [a] duty has never been expressed as a tort duty." Id. at 343.
192. See also Cherne, 572 N.W.2d at 339.
i,.,. .V_.tt i IX. CV Uvl3O, a k - -tJ y' 33, 07 0 P noo Ia act. n d l..l
state "an insurance company's obligation regarding settlement has frequently
been viewed as the breach of a duty to the insured that sounds in tort, rather than
as a claim that is based on breach of the insurance contract." Id. at 878 (citing
Norwood v. Travelers Ins. Co., 204 Minn. 585, 585, 284 N.W. 785, 785 (1939)).
194. See Olson, 277 N.W.2d at 386.
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tort."195 This language suggests two standards apply.
First, punitive damages are not recoverable absent an independent,
willful tort. Such language is wholly consistent with the Lawton decision of
New Hampshire, creating the contract theory of recovery, along with the
Saltou, and Haagenson decisions.' 96
The second standard proposed for punitive damages reads some-
thing like this: punitive damages are not recoverable unless the breach of
contract constitutes a tort. This standard echoes that of the Gruenberg deci-
sion of the California Supreme Court, creating the tort theory of first-197
party recovery. Hence, the tort theory seed may indeed blossom in
Minnesota.
Like Gruenberg, Olson dealt with the duties obligating an insurer in
handling the claim of an insured, namely a duty not to withhold, unrea-
sonably, payments due under a particular insurance policy. 98 In essence,
what Olson states is that, like Gruenberg, the breach itself may involve a viola-
tion of the implied good-faith obligation, thereby triggering an insured's
right to punitive relief.
Pillsbury sounds in tort for the same reasons as Olson. In short, Pills-
bury cites Olson for the proposition that "[p]unitive damages... are not
recoverable.., except in exceptional cases where the breach of contract
constitutes... [a] tort. Without reiterating the arguments set forth
immediately above, Pillsbury, therefore, sounds in tort as well.
2. The R.L.B. Decision
Wedged between Olson and Pillsbury, a 1986 decision of the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals suggests that the tort theory of recovery governs an
insured seeking damages exceeding her insurance policy limits with an
insurer. The Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in RL.B Enterprises v.• . . 200 .
Liberty National Fire Insurance Co., involved the alleged breach of contract
by an insurer. In RL.B., a couple purchased a business on a contract for
deed, which required them to be named as co-insureds on all policies cov-
ering the business until the debt was paid in full.20 The prior owner's in-
surance agent met with him to suggest a change in insurance carriers.
195. Id. at 388.
196. See supra notes 88-104, 164-181.
197. See supra notes 37-57.
198. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973).
199. Pillsbury Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 425 N.W.2d 244, 248
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988); see also Cheme Contracting Corp. v. Wausau Ins. Co., 572
N.W.2d 339, 344 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that an insurer has no duty inde-
pendent of the contract).
200. 413 N.W.2d 551 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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203
All involved parties agreed on the change. Consequently, an insurance
binder totaling $162,000 was prepared. M However, the insurer never205
transferred the binder to the new insurance company. After fire de-
stroyed the business, the insurer agreed to pay $14 5,000, the amount it
claimed was the policy limit at the time of loss. 2° 6 Significantly, the court
asked whether the insured was entitled to consequential and/or punitive
damages.207
The court noted that the insureds were not entitled to consequential
damages from a fire insurer who allegedly breached a contract absent al-208
legation that the insurer had committed an independent tort. In its
reasoning, the court stated that the consequential and punitive damages
cannot be recovered for breach of contract unless the breach is accompa-2O9
nied by an independent tort. Therefore, under R.L.B., as a condition to
recovering any extra contractual damages, a tort must exist. Such a notion
disposes of the key to the contract theory: that an insured is always allowed
to seek damages that were reasonably foreseeable at the time of contract
formation, whether or not the damages exceed the policy limits.
IV. MINNESOTA SHOULD ADOPT THE CONTRACT THEORY OF
RECOVERY
There are two primary reasons Minnesota courts should adopt the
contract theory of recovery. First, the tort theory is without sound theo-
retical foundation. Second, the contact theory of recovery satisfies the
concerns of not only the insured, but also of the insurer. Notwithstanding
the preceding arguments, it is clear that the ILL.B. court reached an im-
proper conclusion through miscalculated reasoning.
A. R.L.B. Was Improperly Decided
Regarding the issue of consequential damages stemming from first-
party insurance disputes, the RL.B. court offered, perhaps, the shortest
piece of legal analysis found in any Minnesota decision. The court simply
stated, "[ i] t is well settled that consequential and punitive damages cannot
be recovered for breach of contract unless the breach is accompanied by
an independent tort... since [the plaintiff] did not allege that [the in-
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entided to consequential and punitive damages."
2 10
The FLL.B. court was partially correct. True, a plaintiff cannot typi-
cally recover punitive damages for a breach of contract unless some tort
accompanies the breach. 2 1' However, the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts in no way blends punitive and consequential damages into a single
concoction, as the court would have it. Thus, it is not "well settled" (to
place it in the court's schema) that an insured can collect consequential
damages only if a tort exists.
B. The Tort Theory of Recovery Lacks Theoretical Foundation
The Supreme Court of Utah in Beck constructed a beautiful critique
of the controversial tort approach to extra-contractual damages stemming
213
from first-party insurance disputes. The court noted, "the analytical
weaknesses of the tort approach are easily seen."21 4
1. Gruenberg's Misplaced Reliance on Third-Party Cases
The Beck court pointed out that the Grzenberg decision of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, considered the "birth" opinion of the tort theory
of recovery, glossed over some key distinctions between first-party and
third-party insureds. 15 The court noted and criticized Gruenber 's shaky
reliance on two third-party, not first-party, insurance disputes. In es-
sence, the Gruenberg court, without precedent, applied the rule of third-
210. See id. at 553 (citation omitted).
211. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 353, 355 (1981) ("Recovery
for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily
harm or the contract or breach is of such a kind that serious emotional distur-
bance was a particularly likely result."); ("Punitive damages are not recoverable for
a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for
which punitive damages are recoverable.").
212. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981) (stating the
expectation interest formula), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355
(1981) (stating the rule for punitive damages).
213. See Beck v. Fire Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Utah 1985).
214. Id. at 799.
215. See id. (citing Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973)).
The court notes that such a distinction is "of no small consequence." Id. "In a
third-party situation, the insurer controls the disposition of claims against its in-
sured, who relinquishes any right to negotiate on his own behalf." Id. (citing Craft
v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 572 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1978)). "An insurer's fail-
ure to act in good-faith exposes its insured to a judgment and personal liability in
excess of the policy limits." Id. (citing Santilli v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 562 P.2d
965, 969 (Or. 1977)). "In essence, the contract itself creates a fiduciary relation-
ship because of the trust and reliance placed in the insurer by its insured." Beck,
701 P.2d at 799 (citing Hal Taylor Assoc. v. Union Am., Inc.), 657 P.2d 743, 748-49
(Utah 1982)).
216. See id. (citing Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1037).
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parties to first-parties.
Why does this matter? Drawing a distinction between first-party and
third-party insureds is a significant threshold step when examining the ob-
ligations between an insurer and insured. For example, the court in Beck
determined that in third-party circumstances, an insurance company must
act in good-faith and be as spirited in protecting the interests of the in-
sured "as it would be in regard to its own. "217 To the contrary, the court
noted that in the first-party area, the insured and the insurer are, essen-
tially, opponents. '8 Hence, Gruenberg, the very foundation upon which
courts across the country have relied upon in adopting the tort approach,
lacks solidity.
2. Agency Law Dictates a Different Result
The Beck court also examined the insurer/insured relationship219
through the law of agency. The court noted that when dealing with a
third-party insured, the insurer acts as an agent with respect to the claim220
in controversy. Agency law classifies all agents as a fiduciary with respect
221
to matters falling within the scope of their agency.
In contrast, in the first-party situation, the rational for implying a fi-222
duciary relationship does not exist. Stated succinctly, first-party insur-
217. See id. One author notes, however, that the duties associated with defend-
ing an insured subject to a liability suit can also lead to a conflict of interest, much
like a first-party insured situation. See Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Re-
sponsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1136, 1138 (1954) (advocating for a rela-
tionship between insurers and insureds that involves mutual duties and rights).
218. See Beck, 701 P.2d at 799; see also Douglas R. Richmond, The Two-Way Street
of Insurance Good-Faith: Under Construction But Not Yet Open, 28 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 95,
107 (1996) (citing State ex rel. Safeco Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rauch, 849 S.W.2d
632, 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)). See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of In-
surance Bad-Faith Law and Litigation, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 74, 76 (1994) (arguing
that "increasingly, plaintiffs groundlessly allege insurance companies' bad-faith in
attempts to win the judicial lottery."); see also Lish, supra note 102, at 1172.
219. See Beck, 701 P.2d at 799-800.
220. See id. at 800.
221. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1)(1958) ("Agency is the fidu-
ciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to
another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and con-
sent by the other so to act."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 cmt. d
(1958) ("An agent is not, as such, in a fiduciary relation with the principal as to
matters in which he is not employed.").
222. See David D. Hallock, Jr., Recent Developments in Marine Hull Insurance:
Circuits, 10 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 277, 326 (1998) (citing Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Love
It Ice Cream Co., 670 P.2d 160, 164 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)); see also Bauman, supra
note 29, at 739 ("[I] t is quite clear that the first-party situation lacked the fiduciary-
like assumption of duty involved in the third-party case, which provided the justifi-
cation for tort treatment in that context.").
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ance agreements do not create a relationship based on trust and reli-225" ,•
ance. Clearly, then, it is difficult to find a theoretically sound basis for
analogizing the duty owed in a third-party context to that owed in a first-
party context," as those adopting the tort theory have.
224
3. What is the Tort Standard Anyway?
In adopting the contract theory of extra-contractual recovery, courts
need to ask one simple question: What losses were reasonably foresee-
able, in the event of breach, at the time of contract formation? To the
contrary, courts conducting a tort analysis have encountered some trouble
resolvin 5what degree of bad-faith is required to maintain suit against an
insurer.
For instance in Gruenberg, the court stated that an insurer may face li-
ability under a bad-faith tort action if it "fails to deal fairly and in good-
faith with its insured by refusing, without 2roper cause, to compensate its
insured for a loss covered by the policy." Yet, the court failed to articu-
late an exact standard for determining bad-faith on behalf of an insurer in
first-party predicaments.
Some states have followed the vague guidance offered by Gruenberg.
Others impose an acrimonious standard for establishing tort liability in
228
first-party insured cases. All said, the lack of an agreed upon standard
223. See Beck, 701 P.2d at 800. This assertion is true because "[i] n a third-party
situation, the insurer controls the disposition of claims against its insured, who re-
linquishes any right to negotiate on his own behalf." Id. at 799.
224. Id. at 800.
225. See Beck, 701 P.2d at 800; see also Bopp, supra note 68, at 527-28. Courts
must deal with Wisconsin's Anderson standard, California's Cruenberg standard, and
an "Alabama," "Nebraska," "North Dakota," "Ohio," and "Wyoming" standard. See
Beck, 701 P.2d at 800.
226. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973); see also
Thomas C. Cady et al., The Law of Insurance Company Claim Misconduct In West Vir-
ginia, 101 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1998) (providing an overview of first and third party
insurance issues stemming from the common law and West Virginia Code).
227. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 146 (Cal. 1979)
("[I] n the context of disability policies, an insurer cannot reasonably and in good-
faith deny payments to its insured without thoroughly investigating the foundation
of its denial."); Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616, 619 (S.C.
1983) ("[I]f an insured can demonstrate bad-faith or unreasonable action by the
insurer in processing a claim under their mutually binding insurance contract, he
[or she] can recover consequential damages in a tort action.").
228. See, e.g., National Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So. 2d 1357, 1362 (Ala.
1982) (explaining that normally an insured must be entitled to directed verdict on
the contract claim); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d
463, 465 (Ark. 1984) (explaining that the insurer's conduct must be dishonest,
malicious, oppressive, and not based on misjudgment or negligence); McCorkle v.
Great Atlantic Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 587 (Okla. 1981) (requiring a clear showing
that the insurer unreasonably, and in bad-faith, withheld payment of the insured's
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throughout the two dozen states that have adopted the tort approach2
29
indicates instability and weakness in the merits of such a theory of recov-
ery.
C. The Contract Approach Satisfies the Concerns of Both the Insured and
the Insurer
In deciding whether Minnesota courts should adopt the tort or con-
tract theory of recovery in first-party bad-faith disputes, two antagonistic
policy objectives must be contemplated. Foremost, courts should protect
consumers from an insurance company's unfair delay or denial of reim-
bursement due in accordance with the terms of the insurer's contract with
the insured. After all, the bargaining power of the insurer vis a vis the230
bargaining power of the insured is "disparate" in the utmost. Nobody
could possibly contend that the insured is in a better position to actually
231
create the terms of the contract with an insurer, let alone enforce the
agreement.
However, those defending the insurance industry contend that the
judicial branch should not dissuade insurers from asserting bona fide de-. 232
fenses to suspect claims. In short, a balance must be struck which pro-
tects both the insurer and the insured from unwanted, and unjust, finan-
cial hardship.
The reasons proffered by various state courts in adopting the tort
claim).
229. See supra text accompanying note 37.
230. See 15A CoucH, supra note 1, § 58:3 ("The duty of good-faith and fair
dealing may also arise due to the inherently unequal bargaining power between
the insured and the insurer."); see also Willy E. Rice, Judicial Bias, The Insurance In-
dustry and Consumer Protection: An Empirical Analysis of State Supreme Courts'Bad-Faith,
Breach of Contract, Breach of Covenant-of-Good-Faith, and Excess-Judgment Decisions,
1900-1991, 41 CATH. U.L. REV. 325, 327 (1992) ("Simply expressed, the two trillion
dollar American insurance industry is enormous.")
231. The power given to an insured stems basically from the freedom to
choose with whom they wish to contract, not what the terms of their contract will
state.
232. See generally Edwark J. Schrenk & Jonathon B. Palmquist, Fraud and its Ef-
fects on the Insurance Industry, 64 DEF. CouNs. J. 23, 23 (1997) (presenting an over-
view of the problems and perceptions associated with insurance fraud). The au-
thors point out some startling statistics regarding the insurance industry. First,
they note that in 1995, property and casualty insurance fraud cost $20 billion. See
id. Additionally, health care fraud that year accounted for $95 billion. See id. The
authors note that this amount equates to approximately 10% of claims paid. See id.
in response, the authors note, "the insurance industry has been apathetic or naive
about the impact of fraud" out of concern for tort liability stemming from investi-
gations. Id. Unfortunately, the insurance industry deals with the problem by sim-
ply passing the costs onto the consumer. See id. These costs have included not
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theory of recovery include legitimate policy objectives. An insured should
be protected; the insurer should compensate the insured for all damages
suffered due to the insurer's misconduct. The insurer has very little moti-
vation to cut a check for proceeds legitimately due their insured. Therein
lies the heart of the tort theory of recovery: motivate insurers to pay.
However, there is no reason the contract approach to extra-
contractual damages does not legitimately serve the same end, while, con-
temporaneously, serving the legitimate interests of the often-disliked in-
surance industry. After all, an insured is always entitled to the benefit of
233the insured's bargain under the contract theory of recovery.
Keep in mind that an insurance policy is nothing more than a con-. 234
tract that spreads risk . Under this arrangement, the insured has the
right to recover that which the insured is entitled under the terms of the
contract in conjunction with the terms implied in law-and nothing fur-
ther. In some instances, this means the insured recovers an amount equal
to or less than the face value of the policy at issue. In other cases, this
means the insured recovers an amount above the express policy limits.
Nevertheless, under no circumstance does the insured recover a wind-
fall--something nonexistent in the law of contracts. 2
5
With the foregoing standard in place, the law is a predictable, bright23623
line. Insurers can better calculate the risks23 7 associated with challeng-
ing a claim raised by the insured, as they are legally entitled, and obli-
gated, to do. Hence, the insurer may be subject to a penalty for a wrong-
ful denial, but the contract theory does not open insurers up to serve as
233. Moreover, Minnesota claims rooted in contract enjoy a generous six-year
(instead of the two-year "tort") statute of limitations. Compare MINN. STAT. § 541.05
(1998) ("Except where the Uniform Commercial Code otherwise prescribes, the
following actions shall be commenced within six years... [u]pon a contract or other
obligation, express or implied, as to which no other limitation is expressly pre-
scribed . ... ") (emphasis added), with MINN. STAT. § 541.07 (1998) ("Except
where the Uniform Commercial Code, this section, section 148A.06, or section
541.073 otherwise prescribes, the following actions shall be commenced within two
years... for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other tort.") (em-
phasis added).
234. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RIsK (1986) (providing an
overview and perspective on what insurance contracts mean).
235. According to Professors Keeton and Widiss, such windfalls pose serious
problems to both insurers and insureds. The authors write "multimillion dollar
awards of punitive damages to individual claimants may quite literally endanger
the financial stability of the insurance industry." KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 33,
at 923.
236. See Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc. 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., concurring) ("In inventing the tort of bad-faith denial of a contract
*.. the California Supreme Court has created a cause of action so nebulous in
outline and so unpredictable in application that it more resembles a brick thrown
from a third story window than a rule of law.") (citations omitted).
237. See supra text accompanying note 227.
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the golden parachute of one lucky plaintiff and that plaintiffs contingent
lawyer.
V. CONCLUSION
A first-party insured believing an insurer erroneously denied a claim
has two advantageous distinct legal theories of recovering extra-
contractual damages under the bad-faith doctrine. Both the tort and con-
tract means of redress involve theories with independent, though overlap-238
ping, elements, defenses and recoveries. Minnesota courts have hinted
at adopting both approaches, should the recognition of first-party bad-
faith occur.
An exclusive and expressly noted adoption of the contract theory by
the Minnesota Supreme Court would serve the needs of all involved in a
pending lawsuit: the insurer, the insured, the lawyers representing them,
and possibly even the judges themselves.
Nearly any breach of contract claim involves action, or inaction, that
a plaintiffs lawyer can strategically construct as negligence, or another in-
tentional tort claim.239 If left without circumscription, however, the "in-
cessant tide of tort law" would nibble at and, in due time, devour contract
law as we know it.240
238. See Firstmark Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Goss, 699 N.E.2d 689, 695 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1998) (citing Egan v. Burkhart, 657 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)).
239. See Princess Cruises, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 950 F. Supp 151, 156 (E.D.
Vir. 1996) (discussing the economic loss doctrine).
240. See id. at 156; see also Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed:
Professor Scallen points out that "[c]ontract [law], however, is not dead... [to
the] contrary, appellate courts, anxious to ease the pressure on increasingly
stretched judicial resources, appear to be narrowing the circumstances under
which plaintiffs may state a cause of action for tort damages... arising from a con-
tractual setting." Id. at 899.
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